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Little is known about the neurobiological mecha-
nisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they
are modulated by social factors such as perceived
group membership. The present study investigates
the neural processes preceding the willingness to
engage in costly helping toward ingroup and out-
group members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their
favorite team (ingroup member) or of a rival team
(outgroup member) experience pain. They were
subsequently able to choose to help the other by
enduring physical pain themselves to reduce the
other’s pain. Helping the ingroup member was best
predicted by anterior insula activation when seeing
him suffer and by associated self-reports of em-
pathic concern. In contrast, not helping the outgroup
member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens
activation and the degree of negative evaluation of
the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula
activation can motivate costly helping, whereas an
antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces
the propensity to help.
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the question of whether human nature is funda-
mentally good or bad has been at the heart of controversial
debates in philosophy, politics, and science. Behavioral social
science research has investigated the conditions under which
people behave in a prosocial manner (reviewed in Dovidio
et al., 2006; Penner et al., 2005). However, very little is known
about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial
decisions and how they are modulated by social factors such
as perceived group membership.
One intriguing outcome of behavioral social science work is
the claim that an altruistic motivation, directed toward the ulti-
mate goal of increasing thewelfare of a person in need, is evokedby empathy, also known as the empathy-altruism hypothesis
(Batson, 1991). Moreover, a number of studies have investigated
whether and how prosocial behavior is affected by social factors
such as group membership (Levine et al., 2005; Stu¨rmer et al.,
2005, 2006). The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies
have shown that people are more likely to help an ingroup
member than an outgroup member in similar need (e.g., Levine
et al., 2005), referred to as ‘‘parochial altruism’’ (De Dreu et al.,
2010). However, other studies did not find reliable differences
in helping across groups (e.g., Stu¨rmer et al., 2006). One
possible explanation for these inconsistent results is that the
decision to help is not only influenced by group membership,
but also by the potential helper’s attitude toward the ingroup or
outgroup member. A positive evaluation of the other has been
found to increase expressed empathic concern, which should
increase the likelihood of helping to relieve the empathy-
inducing need (Batson et al., 2007; Coke et al., 1978; Dovidio
et al., 1990). Ingroup members tend to be evaluated more posi-
tively than outgroup members, which should lead to higher
empathic concern for their suffering and increase the motivation
to help. In contrast, the more negative evaluation of outgroup
members should result in less empathic concern, decreasing
helping motivation. Consistent with the findings of Lanzetta
and Englis (1989), subjects may even take pleasure in the out-
group member’s suffering. However, if an outgroup member is
evaluated positively, ‘‘parochial altruism’’ should be under-
mined. Taken together, there is a large body of behavioral
work focusing on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and incon-
sistent findings regarding models of parochial altruism.
However, the neural factors associated with prosocial decisions
and their modulation by perceived group membership have not
yet been investigated.
Recent fMRI studies in social neuroscience have started to
identify brain networks involved in empathy and their modulation
(for reviews, see Decety and Lamm, 2006; Hein and Singer,
2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009). Most of these studies have
focused on measuring brain signals elicited when participants
are observing other people suffering pain (Akitsuki and Decety,
2009; Benuzzi et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al.,
2007a, 2007b; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2004, 2006,
2008). The comparison of brain activation elicited in participantsNeuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 149
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Neural Predictors of Ingroup and Outgroup Helpingexperiencing pain and that elicited when they merely observe
others experiencing pain showed shared activations in affective
regions of the pain matrix, that is, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
and anterior insula (AI), which were related to self-reported
measures of empathy (reviewed in Singer and Lamm, 2009).
Furthermore, several recent studies have focused on identifying
factors that modulate these empathy-related brain responses
(Bird et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a; Singer
et al., 2006). Contextual appraisal of the situation (Lamm et al.,
2007a) and person characteristics such as alexithymia (a deficit
in understanding one’s own emotions; Bird et al., 2009) and
experience with pain (Cheng et al., 2007) have been found to
modulate empathy-related brain responses in AI and ACC.
Particularly relevant for the current study, Singer et al. (2006)
found that male participants who perceived the suffering person
as being unfair in a monetary exchange game showed nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) activation associated with their expressed
desire for revenge instead of AI activation related to empathy,
suggesting that two antagonistic motivational systems compete
with each other. However, it is unknown whether this observed
brain activation pattern can be extended to another domain
such as perceived group membership of others and how these
antagonistic brain signals relate to actual behavior, such as
engagement in prosocial behavior. Here, we investigate whether
brain responses elicited by witnessing another suffering pain are
modulated by perceived groupmembership and how these brain
responses are related to the prediction of costly helping—or
a lack of helping—toward ingroup and outgroup members.
More specifically, we hypothesized that individual differences
in empathy-related brain activation in AI and ACC elicited when
witnessing another suffering pain should predict differences in
subsequent costly helping. Specifically, ingroup favoritism in
helping should be linked to the difference in empathy-related
brain responses when viewing an ingroup versus outgroup
member in pain. Based on previous findings (Singer et al.,
2006), we further predicted a reduction in empathy-related brain
responses in the core empathy-related network and an increase
in NAcc activation when participants see an outgroup instead of
an ingroup member in pain. Furthermore, participants who see
the outgroup member suffering pain and show activation in
NAcc instead of empathy-related brain regions should show
a decreased tendency to help the outgroup member later on.
Finally, we aimed to compare the relative contributions of
self-reports and brain measures to the prediction of helping the
ingroup and outgroup members.
RESULTS
To test these predictions, we used a natural group manipulation
(fans of different soccer teams) and an fMRI paradigm to assess
brain responses to others’ suffering and costly helping. We re-
cruited male fans of the local soccer team who were paired
with a fellow fan of the same team (‘‘ingroup confederate’’).
Both men received wristbands in the team color and with the
emblem of the local team and met two fans of the local team’s
rival (‘‘outgroup confederates’’), wearing wristbands in the
team color and with the emblem of the local team’s rival. The
two pairs played a competitive soccer quiz game against each150 Neuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.other. The experimenter made sure that the ingroup pair always
won to prompt uniform positive mood.
Before entering the scanner, the participant and confederates
completed the Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS; Wann
and Branscombe, 1993), measuring their identification with their
soccer team, and an Impression Scale (modified from Batson
et al., 1988), on which they separately rated their impression of
the ingroup member and the outgroup members (see Experi-
mental Procedures and Supplemental Information available
online for details).
In Session 1 of the fMRI experiment, we measured partici-
pants’ brain responses while they received highly, moderately,
or mildly painful shocks through electrodes on the backs of their
hands or while they observed the ingroup or an outgroup
member, sitting on either side of the scanner, receive painful
shocks (Singer et al., 2006). The recipient of pain (self, ingroup,
outgroup) and the intensity of the impending shock were indi-
cated by visual cues (Figure 1A). While being scanned, partici-
pants rated how they felt receiving high, medium, or low pain
themselves, or observing it in the ingroup and outgroupmember,
on a rating scale (4, very bad, to 4, very good).
In an independent Session 2, the participant being scanned
again observed the ingroup and outgroup member in pain.
However, this time he was not receiving painful stimulation
himself, but was to select one of three possible courses of action
(Figure 1B). One option was to help the ingroup or outgroup
member by volunteering to receive half of that person’s pain
himself, thus reducing the intensity of that person’s pain stimula-
tion by half (‘‘Help’’ option). Such helping behavior was costly for
the participant because it resulted in a painful shock. The second
optionwas to not help, but towatch a soccer video instead, while
the other suffered pain (‘‘Watch Video’’ option). This option
offered an attractive alternative to helping and distraction from
watching the pain administration. The third option was to not
help, but to watch the other person suffering pain (‘‘Watch
Pain’’ option).
After scanning, the participants completed an Empathic
Concern Scale, a measure of situational empathy (Batson
et al., 1997), separately assessing how they felt when observing
the ingroup member and the outgroup member suffering pain
(see Experimental Procedures and Supplemental Appendix
for details).
Questionnaires
SSIS
All participants filled in the name of the local soccer team as their
favorite sports team and reported high scores of identification
with their team, M = 6.3 (on a Likert scale, ranging from 1, low
identification, to 8, high identification).
Impression Scale
We used the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test for differences in
the average ratings for the ingroup member and the outgroup
member. Confirming the success of the group manipulation,
the average ratings for the ingroup member (M = 3.7, SE = 0.2)
on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988) were significantly
more positive than for the outgroup member (M = 6.0, SE =
1.3, Likert scale from 1 [very much] to 9 [not at all], z = 3.4,
p = 0.001 [Figure S1A available online]).
Figure 1. Example Trials
(A) Session 1. The participant received pain stimu-
lation himself or saw the ingroup or outgroup
member in pain. After each trial, participants indi-
cated how they felt receiving pain themselves or
seeing the ingroup or outgroup member in pain
on a scale from 4 (very bad) to +4 (very good).
(B) Session 2. The scanned participant was not
assigned pain, but knew that the ingroup or the
outgroup member would receive highly painful
stimulation. The participant could decide between
taking half of the other’s pain on himself (help),
watching a soccer video instead of helping and
knowing that the other would receive pain (watch
video), or watching the other receive pain (watch
pain).
(C) Behavioral results of Session 2. Error bars are
standard errors.
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We submitted the average ratings on the Empathic Concern
Scale (Batson et al., 1997) for the ingroup and the outgroup
member to a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The results showed
significantly more self-reported empathy for the ingroupmember
(M= 3.6, SE = 0.2) than for the outgroupmember (M = 3, SE = 0.3)
in pain (z = 2.2, p = 0.025).
Ratings of Self and Others’ Pain in the Scanning
Session 1
We only analyzed the data of 14 participants because 2 partici-
pants did not provide complete ratings. Confirming the results
of the Empathic Concern Scale, the high pain of the outgroup
member was rated significantly less negative than the high
pain of the ingroup member (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, z =
2.7, p = 0.006). For self and the ingroup member, high pain
stimulation was rated as significantly more aversive than
medium pain stimulation, and medium pain stimulation signifi-
cantly more aversive than low pain stimulation (self high-
medium: z = 2.1, p = 0.002; medium-low: z = 3.5, p <
0.001; ingroup high-medium: z = 3.4, p = 0.001; medium-low:
z = 3.3, p = 0.001). Pain ratings for the outgroup memberNeuron 68, 149–160showed a significant difference between
medium and low (z = 2.3, p = 0.021),
but not between high and medium pain
(z < 1) (Figure S1B).
Behavioral Results of the fMRI
Session 2
The behavioral data of fMRI Session 2
were submitted to Wilcoxon signed rank
tests. The results showed that partici-
pants indeed opted to endure pain them-
selves in order to help the other person,
but more so for the ingroup (M = 65.7%,
SE = 6.7) than for the outgroup member
(M = 45.5%, SE = 7.1; z = 3.2, p =
0.001). There was no group effect
regarding the Watch Video option (in-
group M = 26%, SE = 5.8; outgroup M =30.6%, SE = 6.5; z = 1.4, p = 0.15). Participants watched the
outgroup member (M = 23.6%, SE = 6.8) receive pain more
frequently than they watched the ingroup member receive pain
(M = 8%, SE = 3.7; z = 2.8, p = 0.005) (Figure 1C). However,
the Watch Pain option was chosen only by 9 of our 16 partici-
pants, with an average of four trials. Therefore, this option was
not subjected to further analyses.
Our repeated trial design necessary for fMRI studies might
have led to comparisons across trials regarding the frequency
of ingroup and outgroup helping. As a consequence, partici-
pants might have felt some obligation to help, in particular to
increase the frequency of outgroup helping. A potential feeling
of obligation should have built up with an increasing number of
comparisons across trials, reflected in differences between
people’s helping behavior at the beginning and at the end of
the session. To test this assumption, we calculated the
frequency with which the participant helped the outgroup
member in the first half of Session 2 (i.e., the first nine trials per
participant) and in the second half of Session 2 (i.e., the last
nine trials per participant). We then calculated the frequency of
helping across all 16 participants in the two session halves and, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 151
Figure 2. Ingroup Bias in Empathy-Related
Brain Activation in AI and Its Relation to
Behavioral Differences in Helping Ingroup
as Compared with Outgroup Members
(A) Group-averaged beta values extracted from an
independent ROI in AI when subjects witnessed
high as compared with low pain in the ingroup
member (blue) and high as compared with low
pain in the outgroup member (red) in Session 1.
Error bars represent standard errors.
(B) Correlation between (1) individual parameter
estimates extracted from the independent ROI in
left AI when subjects witnessed high versus low
pain in the ingroup member and high versus low
pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and
(2) individual differences in helping the ingroup
compared to the outgroup member (in relation to
the total frequency of helping) in Session 2. IG,
ingroup; OG, outgroup.
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showed no differences between people’s helping behavior in
the first and second half of Session 2, rendering the possibility
unlikely that the helping was primarily based on a feeling of
obligation (frequency of outgroup helping first half = 67 [out of
144 trials]; second half = 65 [out of 144 trials], Mann-Whitney
U-test, U = 10268, p = 0.88; frequency of ingroup helping first
half = 106 [out of 144 trials], second half = 84 [out of 144 trials],
U = 10225, p = 0.81). The lack of sequence effects was further
confirmed by additional analyses contrasting (1) the first
and last quartiles of Session 2 (five trials each; U = 3195,
p = 0.98), and (2) the first two and the last two trials of Session 2
(U = 436, p = 0.82).
fMRI Results
To analyze the link between neural responses when observing
the other’s suffering in Session 1, and helping behavior in
Session 2, we used a region of interest (ROI) approach, following
the guideline for independent ROI analyses (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009). A meta-analysis of three independent fMRI studies using
a similar paradigm as in Session 1 with male participants (Bird
et al., 2009; Singer et al., 2006, 2008) provided nine ROIs
including bilateral insula and ACC (see Table S5 for a list of all
nine ROIs with center coordinates). For each participant we
extracted the beta values averaged over all voxels of each of
the nine ROIs. In addition, we conducted whole-brain multiple
regression analyses, corrected for multiple comparisons across
all nine ROIs (Figure S2). Finally, we also performed whole-brain
analyses (Experimental Procedures, Tables S1–S4).
First, we tested the link between brain responses when
observing suffering of ingroup or outgroup members in Session
1 and helping in Session 2 collapsed across groups. Individual
activation in the left AI when seeing others’ suffering in Session
1 (i.e., the contrast between high versus low pain trials, pooled
across the ingroup and outgroup conditions) predicted the
total number of trials in which people chose to help [r(16) = 0.57,152 Neuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.p = 0.019], and correlated negatively with the number of
trials in which participants opted to watch the video instead of
helping [r(16) = 0.59, p = 0.015]. These results confirm our
hypothesis that the magnitude of responses in left AI when
witnessing another person suffering pain predicts participants’
tendency to engage in costly helping later on. Moreover, indi-
vidual differences in left AI activation correlated significantly
with individual differences in empathic concern expressed on
the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997) (r(16) = 0.52,
p = 0.042), indicating that brain responses observed in AI during
the empathy condition are indeed linked to self-reported feelings
of empathic concern. No significant correlations were observed
in the other ROIs (Table S5). Complementary whole-brain regres-
sion analysis confirmed that left AI was the only brain region
showing significant correlation with helping behavior and self-
reported empathic concern (Figure S2). Conjunction analyses
between self pain and other pain further replicate previous find-
ings of shared activation in left AI elicited both when processing
nociceptive stimuli in self and when empathizing with the pain of
others (Tables S2 and S4; for the contrast between high versus
low self-pain and the brain region parametrically modulated by
high, medium, and low pain stimulation; see Table S1).
Next, we tested for differences in brain responseswhen partic-
ipants observed the ingroup versus outgroup member in pain,
and assessed the relationship of these differences to ingroup
favoritism in helping behavior. The group-averaged activation
in left AI was stronger when participants saw high versus low
pain in the ingroup member (high – low ingroup pain) as
compared with high versus low pain in the outgroup member
[high – low outgroup pain; t(15) = 2.9, p = 0.009; Figure 2A], re-
flecting an ingroup bias in empathy-related AI brain responses.
Interestingly, the individual ingroup  outgroup difference in
left AI responses (high – low ingroup pain versus high – low out-
group pain contrast) predicted the extent of participants’ ingroup
favoritism in subsequent costly helping (r(16) = 0.53, p = 0.037;
Figure 2B). The stronger participants’ AI responses to ingroup
Figure 3. Correlations between Brain
Activations When Witnessing Outgroup
Members Suffering Pain and Individual
Differences Both on a Self-Report Impres-
sion Scale and in Outgroup Helping
(A) Correlation between individual parameter esti-
mates extracted from an independent ROI in right
NAcc when subjects witnessed high versus low
pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and
individual differences in outgroup ratings on the
Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988).
(B) Correlation between individual parameter esti-
mates extracted from the independent ROI in left
AI when subjects witnessed high versus low pain
in the outgroup member in Session 1, and indi-
vidual differences in outgroup ratings on the
Impression Scale.
(C) Correlation between individual parameter esti-
mates extracted from an independent ROI in right
NAcc when subjects witnessed high versus low
pain in the outgroup member in Session 1, and
individual differences in the frequency of outgroup
helping in Session 2.
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the ingroupmember, but not the outgroupmember, in Session 2.
Equivalent analyses in the other ROIs revealed no significant
results (Table S5). Complementary whole-brain analyses con-
firmed the significant difference between ingroup and outgroup
pain in left AI, but not in other ROIs (Table S3).
Further, we hypothesized that people might show increased
NAcc activation when they observe outgroup versus ingroup
pain. To test this prediction, we aimed to analyze NAcc activation
in independent ROIs, unbiased by lateralization. To do so, we
first used the ROIs provided in an independent previous paper
by Knutson et al. (2008) because they allow us to define ROIs
in bilateral NAcc, in contrast to other relevant studies that only
reported unilateral NAcc activation (Singer et al., 2006; Takaha-
shi et al., 2009). From these ROIs in bilateral NAcc (Knutson
et al., 2008), we extracted activations for high – low outgroupNeuron 68, 149–160and ingroup pain. On average, there
was no significant group effect in NAcc
brain responses [right NAcc, t(15) =
0.81, p = 0.44; left NAcc, t(15) = 0.96,
p = 0.35].
Based on previous social science
models stressing the important role of
subjective evaluation (Batson et al.,
2007), we tested the possibility that the
lack of observed main effect in NAcc
was driven by individual differences in
outgroup impression cancelling each
other out on group average. For this, we
computed an additional analysis corre-
lating individual differences in NAcc
activation for high – low pain (ingroup;
outgroup) with people’s subjective
ratings on the Impression Scale (Batson
et al., 1988). And indeed, for the outgroupcondition, the results showed a significant correlation in right
NAcc: the more negative the participants’ impression of the out-
group member, the stronger participants’ brain signal in right
NAcc when seeing the outgroup member in pain [r(16) = 0.51,
p = 0.04; Figure 3A]. There was no significant correlation
between ingroup impression ratings and high – low ingroup
pain [r(16) = 0.19, p = 0.47, significantly different from the out-
group correlation, ANCOVA, F(1,28) = 5.1, p = 0.031]. This
reflects invariably positive impression ratings for the ingroup
member and a general lack of NAcc activation when observing
an ingroup member suffering pain.
An equivalent analysis in the left AI revealed that a negative
impression of the outgroup member was also linked to
a decrease in activation in left AI when seeing the outgroup
member in pain [r(16) = 0.54, p = 0.03; Figure 3B]. Taken
together, these results indicate that individual NAcc activation, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 153
Table 1. Results of Commonality Analyses
Unique and Common Variance
Contributions of the Predictors
Ingroup
Helping
Outgroup
Helping
U1 (AI) 0.225 0.009
U2 (NAcc) 0.002 0.243
U3 (Empathic Concern Scale) 0.164 0.008
U4 (Impression Scale) 0.015 0.102
C12 (AI + NAcc) 0.008 0.003
C13 (AI + Empathic Concern Scale) 0.117 0
C14 (AI + Impression Scale) 0.013 0.029
C23 (NAcc + Empathic Concern Scale) 0.002 0.008
C24 (NAcc + Impression Scale) 0.002 0.17
C34 (Empathic Concern
Scale + Impression Scale)
0.013 0.07
C123 (AI + NAcc + Empathic
Concern Scale)
0.03 0
C124 (AI + NAcc + Impression Scale) 0.005 0.04
C134 (AI + Empathic Concern
Scale + Impression Scale)
0.067 0.028
C234 (NAcc + Empathic Concern
Scale + Impression Scale)
0.003 0.01
C1234 (AI + NAcc + Empathic Concern
Scale + Impression Scale)
0.017 0.027
P
(= total explained variance) 0.589 0.597
Numbers refer to unique (U) and common (C) contributions in explaining
variance in ingroup helping and outgroup helping. Predictors are (1) acti-
vation in AI, (2) activation in NAcc elicited when subjects see an ingroup
member/outgroup member in pain, (3) self-reported empathy for ingroup
member/outgroup member on the Empathic Concern Scale, and (4) self-
reported impression of ingroup member/ outgroup member on the
Impression Scale. Significant contributions are shown in bold.
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pants saw an outgroup member in pain were modulated by
their impression of the outgroup member. Again, there were no
such significant correlations in any of the other ROIs (Table S5).
Moreover, there was no significant correlation between the
impression ratings of the ingroup member and left AI activation
for ingroup pain [r(16) = 0.04, p = 0.9].
To test whether NAcc activation in Session 1 predicts out-
group helping in Session 2, we computed a correlation between
individual beta values of high – low outgroup pain activation from
bilateral ROIs in the NAcc and the frequency of helping the out-
group member. In line with our prediction, we observed a nega-
tive correlation between individual right NAcc activation in
Session 1 and subsequent outgroup helping; the stronger
a subject’s activation in right NAcc when observing suffering
in the outgroup member, the less likely he was to help him
[r(16) = 0.59, p = 0.016; Figure 3C]. There was no significant
correlation in left NAcc [r(16) = 0.10, p = 0.69].
In complementary analyses, we tested the robustness of
effects found in right NAcc using different ROIs taken from two
other independent studies (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al.,
2009; see Experimental Procedures for details). Confirming the
results of our main analysis with the ‘‘Knutson ROIs,’’ we found
a significant negative correlation between right NAcc activation
when participants were observing the outgroup member in
pain in Session 1 and helping the outgroup member in Session
2 [ROI from Singer et al. (2006), r(16) = 0.53, p = 0.033; ROI
from Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = 0.51, p = 0.043], which in
turn correlated positively with participants’ outgroup ratings on
the Impression Scale [ROI from Singer et al. (2006), r(16) =
0.52, p = 0.039; ROI from Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = 0.5,
p = 0.048]. There were no significant results in left NAcc [corre-
lation with frequency of helping the outgroup member: ROI
from Singer et al. (2006), r(16) = 0.2, p = 0.45; ROI from Taka-
hashi et al. (2009), r(16) = 0.28, p = 0.28; correlation with out-
group impression: ROI from Singer et al. (2006), r < 1; ROI from
Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = 0.15, p = 0.57]. These results
show that we were able to replicate our NAcc results in ROIs
from three different independent studies, which reflects their
robustness.
In a final integrative step, we sought to compare the relative
contributions of assessed self-report and brain activation
measures to the prediction of costly helping in the ingroup
and the outgroup condition. To this end, we conducted com-
monality analyses to assess the unique and common variance
contributions of neural predictors (activation in AI and NAcc)
and self-report predictors (Empathic Concern Scale and
Impression Scale) to explained variance in helping toward
the ingroup and the outgroup member (see Experimental
Procedures for details).
Helping the ingroupmember was best predicted by the unique
contribution of left AI activation when the participant saw the
ingroup member in pain (U1 = 0.225 = 22.5% of the variance in
ingroup helping) the unique contribution of the rating on the
Empathic Concern Scale for the ingroup member (U3 =
0.164 = 16.4% of the variance in ingroup helping; both p <
0.05), and the shared variance of these two measures (C13 =
0.117 = 11.7% of the variance in ingroup helping; p < 0.1;154 Neuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Table 1). There were no significant differences in the size of the
contribution of these components (p > 0.05, value corresponding
to the 95% confidence interval of the bootstrapping distribution,
D = 0.12, AI versus Empathic Concern scale, D = 0.06; AI versus
AI + Empathic Concern scale, D = 0.11; Empathic Concern scale
versus AI + Empathic Concern scale, D = 0.05; Experimental
Procedures for details). No other contributions were significant
(all p > 0.3; Figure S3A).
In contrast, significant predictors for helping the outgroup
member were the unique contribution of NAcc activation when
the participant saw the outgroup member in pain (U2 =
0.243 = 24.3% of the variance in outgroup helping), the shared
contribution of NAcc activation and the ratings on the Impression
Scale for the outgroup member (C24 = 0.17 = 17% of the
variance in outgroup helping; both p < 0.05), and the unique
contribution of the rating on the Impression Scale (U4 =
0.102 = 10.2% of the variance in outgroup helping; p < 0.1; Table
1). No other contributions were significant (Empathic Concern
Scale and Impression Scale, p > 0.1; all others, p > 0.3;
Figure S3B). The unique contribution of NAcc activation was
significantly greater than that of the Impression Scale (p <
0.05), suggesting that people’s brain responses in NAcc were
better predictors of their future outgroup behavior than their
Neuron
Neural Predictors of Ingroup and Outgroup Helpingself-reported measures of outgroup impression (value corre-
sponding to the 95% confidence interval of the bootstrapping
distribution, D = 0.14, NAcc versus Impression scale, D = 0.15;
NAcc versus NAcc + Impression Scale, D = 0.07; Impression
Scale versus NAcc + Impression Scale, D = 0.072; Experimental
Procedures for details).
DISCUSSION
The goal of our study was to investigate the neurobiological
basis of prosocial behavior; more specifically, the decision to
help an ingroup or outgroup member suffering pain. We hypoth-
esized that empathy-related brain activation when witnessing
others’ suffering pain would predict subsequent helping
behavior, and that such empathy-related responses would
mediate the effect of group membership on helping. Further,
we predicted that participants would show a decreased
tendency to help if they responded with NAcc activation instead
of empathy-related activation to others’ suffering. Finally, we
aimed to determine the relative contributions of brain responses
and self-report measures to the prediction of later helping
behavior toward the ingroup or outgroup member.
Confirming previous results in empathy-for-pain research (for
reviews, see Decety and Lamm, 2006; Hein and Singer, 2008;
Singer and Lamm, 2009), both our ROI and our whole-brain
analyses revealed enhanced activation in AI when participants
witnessed others’ pain. In line with previous studies reporting
correlations between observed activation in AI and subjective
affective ratings (Akitsuki and Decety, 2009; Benuzzi et al.,
2008; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a; Saarela et al.,
2007; Singer et al., 2008), activation in AI was significantly corre-
lated with subjective state measures of felt empathic concern
assessed postscan with the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson
et al., 1997). This result is in line with previous social psycholog-
ical models claiming that empathic concern, that is, feeling for
another, motivates helping, in contrast to the so-called feeling
of empathic distress or personal distress, which is an aversive
and self-oriented emotional response to the suffering of others
that often results in withdrawal behavior motivated by the desire
to protect oneself from negative emotions (Batson et al., 1983;
Eisenberg et al., 1989).
In contrast to other fMRI studies focusing on empathy for pain,
empathy-related activation in the present study was observed in
left AI only. The lateralization of empathy-related brain activation
was addressed in a recent paper that analyzed activations in 168
participants from nine different empathy-for-pain studies (Lamm
and Singer, 2010). Formal tests of asymmetry based on laterali-
zation indices did not reveal hemispheric asymmetry. However,
in line with our results, inspection of the thresholded statistical
parametricmaps showed stronger activation in left fronto-insular
cortex.
More importantly, our results showed stronger brain
responses in left AI when participants witnessed an ingroup
member as compared with an outgroup member suffering
pain. This finding suggests an ingroup bias in empathy-related
brain responses in the anterior insular cortex, which extends
previous studies on empathy modulation (Cheng et al., 2007;
Lamm et al., 2007a, 2007b; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al.,2006) (reviewed in Hein and Singer, 2008) as well as previous
studies investigating the impact of group membership on neural
correlates of fear (Olsson et al., 2005) and face processing
(Golby et al., 2001; Lieberman et al., 2005; Van Bavel et al.,
2008; Xu et al., 2009). Furthermore, we found that witnessing
an outgroup member suffering pain elicited activation in right
NAcc along with a decrease in empathy-related activation in
left AI. NAcc is known to receivemajor projection fromascending
dopaminergic pathways, which are long known to be crucial for
reward processing (Schultz, 1986, 2000, 2002). In social
contexts, NAcc activation has also been observed when people
derive pleasure from themisfortune of others (Singer et al., 2006;
Takahashi et al., 2009). In the context of these findings, the NAcc
activation in our study might imply that watching a negatively
evaluated outgroup member receiving pain was processed in
a reward-related manner.
Extending previous results showing average enhanced NAcc
activation in males witnessing pain in people who behaved
unfairly in a monetary exchange game (Singer et al., 2006), we
show here that NAcc activation is mediated by participants’
social evaluation of the other person. In other words, the simple
fact that a person is an outgroup member was not sufficient to
elicit NAcc activation in all subjects while they observed him
suffering pain. In order to activate NAcc, the observer needed
to have a strong enough negative impression of the suffering
person. This observation may also help to explain the mixed
findings of behavioral studies investigating parochial altruism:
Sometimes people have indeed been found to be more likely
to help an ingroup than an outgroup member in similar need
(e.g., Levine et al., 2005). However, other times no such differ-
ences could be observed (e.g., Stu¨rmer et al., 2006). Our findings
suggest that the decision to help may not only be determined by
perceived group membership; it might also be influenced by the
potential helper’s attitude toward the ingroup or outgroup
member (see also Batson et al., 2007). If the only information
one has about a person in need is group membership, as in
the research of Levine et al. (2005), then group membership is
likely to determine one’s attitude only—and one’s helping. If,
however, one can derive additional information about the other,
this additional informationmay also affect one’s evaluation of the
person in need and, in turn, one’s likelihood of helping. Even
though, in the present paradigm, subjects did not know the
ingroup and outgroup members, they were still able to form an
impression by their mere presence in the same waiting and
scanner room.
Most importantly, our study demonstrated that brain
responses when seeing others’ suffering pain predict actual
helping behavior at a later point in time. Empathy-related activa-
tion in left AI predicted the frequency of later costly helping. The
individual extent of a person’s ingroup bias in left AI response
was linked to the extent of ingroup favoritism in helping behavior.
A refusal to help the outgroup member later on was predicted by
the magnitude of individual NAcc activation in the participant
when he saw the outgroup member suffering before. Common-
ality analyses showed that helping the ingroup member was
best predicted by individual left AI responses and self-report
measures on an empathy questionnaire, whereas NAcc activa-
tion, compared with self-report on a group-impression scale,Neuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 155
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member.
Taken together, our findings suggest that the decision to
engage in or refrain from costly helping may result from the
interplay between two competing motivational systems. Activa-
tion in AI when witnessing a person’s suffering reflects empathy-
based motivation and increases people’s propensity to help. In
contrast, activation in NAcc, reflecting motivation counteracting
empathy, is associated with letting the other person suffer.
Which of the two systems is dominant in a concrete helping
situation seemed to be determined by the evaluation of the
suffering person. A positive evaluation elicited empathy-related
AI activation, and a decrease in NAcc activation, resulting in a
greater propensity to help. Such an interpretation is in line
with recent behavioral evidence that showed a positive relation-
ship between the evaluation of a person in need, empathic
concern, and helping (Batson et al., 2007). Complementarily,
our results revealed that participants who rated the outgroup
member negatively showed increased activation in NAcc and
a reduction in empathy-related AI responses and, as a conse-
quence, helped the outgroup member less. Overall, ingroup
members were evaluated more positively than outgroup
members, resulting in an ingroup bias in empathy-related AI
responses and ingroup favoritism in helping. Interestingly,
however, if the outgroup member was evaluated positively, his
suffering also elicited an empathy-related AI response instead
of NAcc activation, and he received help despite his outgroup
membership. Emphasizing the immediate practical relevance
of our findings, this implies that increasing empathy in people
by, for example, providing them with more information about
outgroup members can override their callousness toward the
suffering of an outgroup member and reduce ingroup favoritism
in helping behavior, with all its detrimental effects, in and across
societies.
Complementing these findings, our study offers important
methodological insights by comparing the contributions of brain
measures and self-report measures to predicting ingroup and
outgroup helping. The results of the commonality analyses
showed that both brain responses and self-reports contribute
to the prediction of interindividual differences in costly helping
(11.7% for AI + Empathic Concern Scale; 17% for NAcc +
Impression Scale). However, we also found sizable unique
contributions (22.5% for the AI, 16.4% for the Empathic Concern
Scale, 24.3% for the NAcc, and 10.2% for the Impression Scale),
suggesting that brain responses in participants witnessing
others’ suffering and participants’ self-reports capture different
aspects of the motivation to help. Brain responses as compared
with self-report measures are probably better indicators of
participants’ spontaneous, possibly unconscious, emotional
responses. Accordingly, they should reflect a person’s real moti-
vations and be unbiased by social desirability effects (Greenwald
and Banaji, 1995), which are known to affect self-reports in
socially sensitive situations such as when outgroup members
are evaluated (Kawakami et al., 2009). Supporting this view,
the unique contribution of NAcc activation, as compared with
self-reported impression of the outgroup member, was more
powerful in predicting future helping behavior toward the out-
group member. This finding suggests that brain responses are156 Neuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.particularly useful for predicting a person’s behavior toward
a nonpreferred other, such as an outgroup member. In contrast
to brain responses, self-reports require that people reflect on
their feelings and thoughts. Thus, they allow for more fine-
grained distinctions between different feelings and, according
to our results, are reliable predictors of future helping behavior
toward a preferred other, like an ingroup member.
In sum, our study identified two neurobiological processes
associated with decisions to help or withdraw from prosocial
behavior, and provides a neurobiologically informed account
of ingroup favoritism in prosocial behavior. Furthermore, it
demonstrates the reliability of imaging data in predicting later
behavior, especially in socially sensitive situations such as
when participants are helping an outgroup member.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants and Confederates
Participants (16men; mean age = 29.8, SE = 1.6), recruited from the fan club of
a local soccer team, gave informed consent and the study was approved by
the Research Ethics Committee of Zurich (E-24/2008). We employed three
male college students as confederates. They posed either as a fellow fan
of the same football team (ingroup member) or a fan of the rival soccer team
(outgroup member), counterbalanced across participants.
Prescanning Procedure
Details about the cover story are provided in the Supplemental Information.
After the competitive soccer quiz (see above), one of the outgroup confeder-
ates was sent away, ostensibly to take part in an EEG version of the experiment
in another room, and the participant, the ingroup confederate, and the remain-
ing outgroup confederate were taken to the scanner control room. There, we
attached pain electrodes to the dorsumof their left hands. Following a standard
procedure (Singer et al., 2004, 2006), we determined individual thresholds for
highly, moderately, and mildly painful sensation, using electrical stimulation
(monopolar, monophasic, pulse width: 500 ms; frequency: 30 Hz; duration:
500 ms) from a custom-made stimulator (Compex; Keller et al., 2002). The
experimenter then explained that in the first experimental session all three of
them would receive highly, moderately, or mildly painful stimulation. In the
second experimental session, one of the three would not receive painful
stimulation, but be able to decide whether to influence the painful stimulation
of the others. The person who would not receive pain in the second session
was to be determined by chance (viz., the person who drew the shortest
match). Holding up three partially concealed matches, the experimenter
made sure that the two confederates always drew first and selected the long
matches, leaving the participant the short one.
Each of the three people had a separate visual display: the participant via
back-projection from a mirror onto a screen; the two confederates outside
the scanner via goggles. This assured that the participant’s ratings and
decisions were strictly anonymous. Finally, the three men were told that they
would not meet after the experiment because the participant in the scanner
would need to stay longer to complete an anatomical scan. The other two
men would leave the building before the anatomical scan began.
Questionnaires
Impression Scale
The items assessed participants’ awareness of the other’s ingroup or outgroup
membership (e.g., How similar to you do you think the person with the white/
red wristband is?; How much do you think you and this person have in
common?; To what extent would you use the term ‘‘we’’ to describe yourself
and this person?; To what extent do you see yourself and this person as
part of the same group?), and their evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup
member (e.g., How much do you think you might like to interact with this
person at some future time?; How likeable did you find this person?; Were
you to meet this person, how likely do you think it is that you would become
Neuron
Neural Predictors of Ingroup and Outgroup Helpingfriends?; see Supplemental Appendix). The high internal consistency reliabil-
ities (ingroup, Cronbach’s a = 0.85; outgroup, Cronbach’s a = 0.89) showed
that the awareness of the other’s group membership and personal evaluation
of him were strongly correlated.
While completing the ingroup and outgroup Impression Scales, the partici-
pant was still sitting in the control room, separate from the confederates who
were already seated in the scanning room.
Empathic Concern Scale
The scale assessed the extent to which participants experienced a certain
affective state on a 7-point scale (e.g., How sympathetic, softhearted, warm,
compassionate, tender, moved did you feel when you saw the person with
the white/red wristband receiving highly painful shocks?; internal consistency
reliability ingroup: Cronbach’s a = 0.91, internal consistency reliability out-
group: Cronbach’s a = 0.93; Supplemental Appendix). It is a subscale of
a 20 item emotional response scale (Batson et al., 1997 for details). The other
subscale measuring Personal Distress was not used here, because our study
focused on the relationship between empathy and helping, without a priori
hypotheses for the impact of personal distress. However, we conducted
complementary analyses with the Personal Distress scale (Table S5).
Scanning Procedure
Session 1
Session 1 was based on a 33 3 factorial design, with the first factor represent-
ing ‘‘intensity of pain stimulation’’ (low, medium, high) and the second factor
representing ‘‘recipient’’ (self, ingroup member, outgroup member). The scan-
ning session consisted of 18 blocks with six stimuli: two high pain, twomedium
pain, and two low pain. One-third of these blocks included stimulation of the
self (participant); one-third, stimulation of the ingroup member; and one-third,
stimulation of the outgroup member. Block order and stimulus type were
pseudorandomly permuted (repetitions of block type were limited to one,
and stimulus type repetitions, to two). In total, there were 12 trials per condi-
tion. An example trial with timeline is shown in Figure 1A. Each block of pain
stimulation was followed by an 8 s video with soccer scenes, representing
the ‘‘soccer part’’ of the paradigm, consistent with the cover story (see Supple-
mental Information). All videos showed beneficial scenes for the local soccer
team to keep the emotional valence constant and to boost participants’
identification with their soccer team.
Session 2
The experimental setup (position of the confederates, pain electrodes) and the
overall design of Session 2 were comparable to those of Session 1. The main
difference was that now, only the ingroup or outgroup member received pain,
and only two of the pain levels were used—high and low. The participant in the
scanner did not receive stimulation, but was asked to choose between three
decision options: (1) to help the ingroup or outgroup member by enduring
half of the pain, (2) not to help and watch a soccer video, or (3) not to help
and watch the other person endure the pain.
Session 2 consisted of 18 blocks with four stimuli each (two high pain, two
low pain). Half of the blocks included stimulation of the ingroup member; half,
of the outgroupmember. Block order and stimulus typewere pseudorandomly
permuted (repetitions of block type were limited to one, and stimulus type
repetitions to two). In total, there were 18 trials per condition. An example trial
with timeline is shown in Figure 1B. Each block of pain stimulation was
followed by an 8 s video with soccer scenes, beneficial for the participant’s
team.
If the participant chose the helping option, the pain bar display was shown
for 1500 ms, with the participant’s pain bar rising from the low to the medium
level and the other’s (ingroup or outgroup member’s) pain bar dropping from
the maximal to the medium level, followed by a flash and medium pain
stimulation for the helper (Figure 1B). Helping was only possible in the high
pain condition because it would have made no sense to take half of the other’s
low pain (i.e., not painful) stimulation. Lowpain trials were included in Session 2
because we feared it would be irritating and implausible for the participant to
see the others invariably facing highly painful shocks. However, the low pain
condition was not included in the analyses. If the participant chose to watch
a video instead of helping, a 6 s soccer video started with scenes favorable
for the participant’s favorite team. The participant knew that while he was
watching soccer, the ingroup or outgroup member received the highly painfulshock, which was indicated before in the pain bar display. If the participant
opted to watch the pain of the ingroup or the outgroup member, the pain
bar display appeared for 1500 ms, indicating again the level of stimulation
the other was to receive, followed by the 1000 ms flash.
Not all decision options were used by all participants. This resulted in a large
number of empty decision cells across participants, which would considerably
reduce the statistical power of any imaging analyses. Taking this into account,
and given that the focus of our study was to predict helping in the Session 2
from brain responses in the independent Session 1, we did not analyze the
imaging data from Session 2.
Image Acquisition and Analysis
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole-body MR
Scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the University
Hospital Zurich, equipped with an 8-channel Philips SENSitivity Encoded
(SENSE) head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T1–weighted
transversal images (0.75 mm slice thickness). For functional imaging, we used
a SENSE (Pruessmann et al., 1999) T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging
sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. We acquired 33 axial slices
covering the whole brain with a slice thickness of 3.2 mm (interslice gap of
0.3 mm; descended acquisition; TR = 2000 ms; TE = 35 ms; flip angle = 82,
field of view = 220 mm; matrix size = 128 3 128). A total of 804 volumes
were obtained in Session 1; in Session 2, 616 to 684 volumes were obtained,
depending on the choices made by the participants (e.g., trials in which partic-
ipants chose the Watch Video option were longer than Helping trials).
The images were analyzed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, UK), using an event-related model (Josephs et al.,
1997). To correct for head movements, all functional volumes were realigned
to the first volume (Friston et al., 2009) spatially normalized to a standard
template with a resampled voxel size of 3 3 3 3 3 mm, and smoothed using
a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 10 mm
(6 mm at the first level, 8 mm at the second level). To remove low-frequency
drifts from the data, high-pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128 s was
applied. After preprocessing, statistical analysis was carried out using the
general linear model (Friston et al., 1995). Regressors of interest weremodeled
using a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) with time derivative,
the latter accounting for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel variation in the
response peak (Henson et al., 2002). We defined separate regressors from
each trial onset (presentation of the anticipatory cue) to the offset of the pain
bars, covering a time window of 2000 ms, and for each pain onset (presenta-
tion of the flash) to pain offset, covering a time window of 1000 ms. Residual
effects of head motion were corrected for by including the six estimated
motion parameters for each subject as regressor of no interest in the design
matrix. Contrast images were calculated by applying appropriate linear
contrasts to the parameter estimates for the regressor of each event. For
whole-brain analyses (see Supplemental Information) these contrast images
were entered into one-sample t tests across the 16 participants to initiate
random effect group analyses (Penny and Holmes, 2004).
ROI Analyses
In our main analyses, we used an ROI approach. Using the Marsbar toolbox
(Brett et al., 2009), independent ROIs were defined in nine brain regions, based
on activations (p uncorrected < 0.001) from a meta-analysis of previous
studies with similar empathy-for-pain paradigms (Bird et al., 2009; Singer
et al., 2006, 2008) (Table S5). Moreover, we defined ROIs in bilateral NAcc
based on three different independent previous studies: (1) Knutson et al.
(2008) with 10 12 2 and 10 12 2 as center coordinates (8 mm diametrical
spheres), (2) Singer et al. (2006) with 9 15 9 as center coordinate (from the
original activation map) and its mirror image with center coordinate 9 15 9,
and (3) Takahashi et al. (2009) with 8mmdiametrical spheres around the center
coordinate reported in the paper (14 2 12) and its mirror image (center
coordinate 14 2 12).We extracted individual beta values, averaged over all
voxels of the ROIs. Correlation results are reported with a significance level
of p < 0.05.
Commonality Analysis
We conducted commonality analyses (Nimon et al., 2008) to assess the unique
and common variance contributions of the brain and self-report measures
considered in our study to the prediction of helping behavior. We includedNeuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 157
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group helping; predictor 1 = each participant’s beta values in left AI when
seeing high – low ingroup/outgroup pain, predictor 2 = each participant’s
beta values in right NAcc when seeing high – low ingroup/outgroup pain,
predictor 3 = each participant’s mean score for the ingroup/outgroup member
on the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997), and predictor 4 = each
participant’s mean score for the ingroup/outgroup member on the Impression
Scale (Batson et al., 1988). In a first step, R-squared coefficients were calcu-
lated for the correlation of ingroup/outgroup helping with each predictor, and
all possible combinations of predictors. The results are presented in Table S6.
In a second step, we conducted two commonality analyses, one including all
R-square values of ingroup-related predictors of ingroup helping, and one with
all R-square values of outgroup-related predictors of outgroup helping. Using
Equation 1 below, we computed the unique (U) and common (C) variance
contribution of the predictors to the total explained variance of ingroup and
outgroup helping:
U1=  R2234+R21234
U2=  R2134+R21234
U3=  R2124+R21234
U4=  R2123+R21234
C12=  R234+R2134+R2234 R21234
C13=  R224+R2124+R2234 R21234
C14=  R223+R2123+R2234 R21234
C23=  R214+R2124+R2134 R21234
C24=  R213+R2123+R2134 R21234
C34=  R212+R2123+R2124 R21234
C123=  R24+R214+R224+R234 R2124 R2134 R2234+R21234
C124=  R23+R213+R223+R234 R2123 R2134 R2234+R21234
C134=  R22+R212+R223+R224 R2123 R2124 R2234+R21234
C234=  R21+R212+R213+R214 R2123 R2124 R2134+R21234
C1234=R21+R22+R23+R24 R212 R213 R214 R223 R224
 R234+R2123+R2124+R2134+R2234 R21234
The results are reported in Table 1.
Note that negative commonalities probably reflect suppression effects, or
occur when some of the correlations among predictors are positive and others
are negative (Pedhazur, 1997). However, given that none of the negative
variance contributions reached significance, we refrain from interpreting them.
In a third step, we tested the significance of the observed variance contribu-
tions against a random baseline (Horn, 1965). As the random baseline we used
the mean of the variance contributions from 5000 commonality analyses,
computed with 5000 random permutations of each of the four ingroup/out-
group predictors (see Figure S3).
In a fourth step, we used a bootstrapping procedure to statistically test for
differences between variance contributions, which, in step three, were signif-
icant on the 90% level (see Figure S3). We created 5000 pseudosamples with
16 subjects each, by sampling with replacement from our original sample.
Each bootstrap pseudosample was submitted to the commonality analysis
described above, and the differences between the respective variance
components were calculated. The significance of these differences was tested
with symmetric basic bootstrap confidence intervals (Davison and Hinkley,
1997). We corrected for multiple comparisons using a stepwise multiple
testing procedure (Romano and Wolf, 2005). In short, we computed the distri-
bution of themaximumdifferences between the individual conditions and used
the value corresponding to the 95% confidence interval.
Whole-Brain Analyses of Main Effects, Parametric Pain Modulation,
Conjunction Analyses
The results of the whole-brain analyses are reported in Tables S1 to S4. All
whole-brain results are reported with a threshold of p uncorrected < 0.001.
Activations that were also significant at p < 0.05 FDR correction are marked
correspondingly. The anatomical localizations of the functional activations
were identified using an anatomical atlas (Duvernoy, 1999) and probabilistic
cytoarchitectonical maps (Eickhoff et al., 2007) implemented in the SPM
toolbox. Subregions in cingulate cortex were classified based on a recent
review of cingulate cytoarchitecture and functions (Vogt, 2005). Analyses
contain (1) the contrast between high and low self pain (high – low self pain)
and the parametrical modulation by high, medium, and low pain stimuli
(Table S1), (2) conjunction analyses, equivalent to a masking procedure158 Neuron 68, 149–160, October 7, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.(Friston et al., 2005), for high – low pain trials in self and others, pooled across
the ingroup and outgroup conditions (Table S2A), and done so separately for
high – low self pain trials and high – low ingroup pain trials (Table S2B) and
high – low self pain trials and high – low outgroup pain trials (Table S2C), (3)
the contrast between observing high and low pain in the ingroup member
and observing high and low pain in the outgroup member (high – low ingroup
pain versus high – low outgroup pain) (Table S3A), the contrast between
observing high and low pain in the ingroup member (high – low ingroup pain)
(Table S3B), and the contrast between observing high and low pain in the out-
group member (high – low outgroup pain) (Table S3C), and (4) the contrast
between observing high and low pain pooled across ingroup and outgroup
conditions ([high – low ingroup pain] and [high – low outgroup pain]) (Table S4).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information for this article includes three figures, six tables,
Supplemental Experimental Procedures, and a Supplemental Appendix and
can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.09.003.
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